

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	PERC-00	DS-00
	EUR-00	FBIE-00	VCI-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	MOFM-00	MOF-00	M-00	VCIE-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	NIMA-00
	PM-00	GIWI-00	FMPC-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	NCTC-00
	SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	SAS-00	FA-00
	SWCI-00	PESU-00	SANA-00		/000W		

O 121604Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7430
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTIO 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000530

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
DOD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAINAND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [MARR](#) [PUM](#) [SU](#) [LY](#) [CD](#)
SUBJECT: CHAD: FORMIN FAKI ON CHA-SUDAN DETENTE
SEQUENCING, JEM/ARMS, AND JEM/DOH

REF: A. NIGRO-AFC EMAIL 11/06
[1](#)B. NDJAMENA 520
[1](#)C. NDJAMENA 503
[1](#)D. NDJAMENA 498
[1](#)E. NDJAMENA 485

Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, Jr, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY

[11.](#) (C) Ambassador met one-on-one with FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat on October 6. Faki said that the next confidence-building step in the Chad-Sudan detente scenario, drafted by Ghazi himself in Ndjamena October 10, was Sudan's to make. Faki said that the Qataris had found JEM's Khalil Ibrahim stubborn and recalcitrant about going to Doha along with other Darfuri groups and negotiating seriously, as had the GoC in its continuing similar talks with JEM. Responding to Ambassador's question regarding reports the USG had heard of "possible foreign arms sales to JEM," Faki replied that the GOC was against the sale of arms to any groups in Chad, including JEM, and that if the USG had any information about such sales, he would like to be the recipient of that information, because the GOC would act on it. The Ambassador also raised the issues of child soldiers, elections in 2010, and the KourouKourou high-security prison.

[12.](#) (C) Faki's response to Ambassador's question on foreign arms sales to JEM was unsurprising. We should consider carefully what action we might want to take in this regard, as we recommended in Ref A. END SUMMARY.

CHAD-SUDAN
BILATERAL PROCESS

[13.](#) (C) Chad-Sudan Detente Process: Faki re-confirmed that the GOC was waiting for the GOS to take the next confidence-building measure, according to the scenario drafted by Sudan envoy Ghazi himself in Ndjamena on October 10 and agreed to by President Deby and Faki at that time.

The sequence of confidence-building measures is: (I) GOS cantons Chad rebels in Sudan a "considerable distance from the Chad-Sudan border." (II) Chad welcomes Sudanese representatives to verify on the spot that there are no JEM bases in Chad. (III) Faki leads a GOC delegation to Khartoum. (See Refs B-E and previous.)

¶4. (C) Dakar Accord Contact Group: Faki said the Libyans had been talking about reviving the Dakar Accord Contact Group, but that had preferred the bilateral path that Ghazi had proposed and that Chad had accepted. Faki said that Chad would be happy to see the Contact group function as "observers" and "verifiers" of the bilateral process, either in Khartoum or in Eastern Chad, or both, however.

¶5. (C) Faki said that Ghazi had promised Sudanese action on the next step "within a week or so" of his visit to NDjamena, but that now that nearly a month had gone by, the GOC was again having its old doubts about Sudanese sincerity: Was the GOS going through a complicated decision process or were they just playing for time?

DOHA/JEM

¶6. (C) Faki said that the Qatari Prime Minister had met with Khalil Ibrahim during his recent visit to Ndjamena to try to convince JEM to drop its pretensions of being the only ones who count in Darfur and to come to Doha to negotiate with the rest of the interested actors. Faki said the Qataris found JEM stubborn and recalcitrant about both propositions. Faki said that the GOC continued to urge Khalil and the JEM to cooperate with international efforts to find a peaceful solution to Darfur through negotiation, but that JEM wasn't listening very hard.

JEM/ARMS SALES

¶7. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of "possible foreign arms sales to JEM." Faki asked what we knew. Ambassador said "the USG had heard things." Faki replied that the GOC was against the sale of arms to any groups in Chad, including JEM. Faki emphasized that if the USG had any information about such sales, he would like to be the recipient of that information, because the GOC would act on it.

DOMESTIC "CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES"

¶8. (SBU) Ambassador told Faki that although domestic issues were not the FORMIN's brief, certain "high profile" internal issues were important for Chad's image within the international community and affected the ability of some of Chad's international friends and partners to "accompany Chad" on a range of geo-political, economic, and strategic issues, including civilian and military assistance issues. The Ambassador urged the GOC to continue to collaborate closely with the international community on child soldier and other children's issues and to continue to move towards credible elections in 2010. The Ambassador also recommended that the GOC find ways of collaborating effectively with the ICRC on the KourouKourou high-security prison, to allow access under international norms, if requested through appropriate channels to do so.

COMMENT

¶9. (C) Faki's response to Ambassador's question on foreign arms sales to JEM was unsurprising. We should consider carefully what action we might want to take in this regard, as we recommended in Ref A.

NIGRO